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option pricing has not only provided a technique for valuation, but it has also created a new field within finance, known as derivatives, and offered a new perspective on related areas including corporate finance, capital budgeting, and financial markets and institutions. In mathematics and computer science, the direction of study in probability theory and numerical methods has been influenced by problems arising from the use of the option pricing technology. In private industry, the Black-Merton-Scholes option pricing theory has generated not just "new types of financial instruments," but also new organizational structures within firms to help manage risk. Even more dramatically, it has enabled a generation of new industries and new markets.
To understand the broad sweep and impact of the Black-Merton-Scholes option pricing theory-that is, to see the entire iceberg rather than just the tip-one needs to step back and start at the beginning. This is the intention of this essay. As such, this essay discusses the state of the art before their discovery, the discovery itself, and finally the ramifications of the discovery.
A Primer on Options
To understand the Black-Merton-Scholes model, one first needs to understand what an option contract is. To understand the various kinds of options, it helps to begin with the idea of a forward contract.
A forward contract is a financial security that obligates its holder-called the "long"-to purchase an underlying asset for a fixed price at a fixed future date. The fixed future price is called the "forward price," and the fixed future date is called the "maturity" date. The counterparty on the opposite side of the forward contract is called the "short." The short has the reciprocal obligation to sell the underlying asset on the maturity date at the agreed-upon forward price. At the time the forward contract is initiated, no cash changes hands. Indeed, no cash flow occurs from entering into a forward contract until the maturity date, when the underlying asset is exchanged for the forward price. A practical example of a forward contract familiar to many economists is the use of such contracts by farmers to hedge future price uncertainties at the time of harvesting by locking in their commodity's selling price near the beginning of a growth cycle.
There are four basic types of option contracts: European calls, European puts, American calls and American puts. Perhaps surprisingly, the option prefixes have nothing to do with geographical considerations. For concreteness and simplicity, I will concentrate on discussing these option contracts in terms of stocks.
A European call option gives its holder the right, but not the obligation, to purchase a stock at a fixed price called the "strike" or "exercise" price-at a fixed future date-called "maturity" or "expiration" date. The key difference between the European call option and a forward contract is that for the option contract, the long does not have to buy the stock at the maturity date. For the forward contract, the long must purchase. A rational holder will, therefore, only exercise the option to purchase at the maturity date if the stock price at that time exceeds the exercise price.
A European put option differs from a European call option in that it gives the right to sell, rather than the right to buy, the underlying stock. An American call option differs from a European call option in that it gives the right to buy at any time after entering the contract and up until and including the maturity date. The European option can only be exercised at the maturity date. Finally, the American put option is identical to the American call except it grants the right to sell.
The key problem in option pricing theory is to determine the value of the option before the maturity date. This calculation determines the price at which the option is bought or sold in the market, and for American-style options, whether the option should be exercised before maturity.
History of the Black-Merton-Scholes Model
The origin of modern option pricing theory is Bachelier's (1900) dissertation on the theory of speculation. In this dissertation, Bachelier derived an option pricing formula that today can be recognized as a close kin to the Black-MertonScholes formula. In addition, he also developed some necessary mathematics related to diffusion processes and Brownian motions. This dissertation, despite the mathematics and economics being slightly flawed, motivated both Samuelson's (1965) paper on option pricing and Ito's (1951 Ito's ( [1987 ) work on stochastic processes.2
Both of these investigations, without the knowledge of their common lineage, separately influenced the development of the Nobel prize winning work. Ito's investigations generated the fundamental theorem of stochastic calculus, known as Ito's lemma, which provides an essential step in the derivation of the Black-MertonScholes formula. In addition, as discussed below, Samuelson's work was the precipitating source for Merton's studies on option valuation and for the initial derivation by Black and Scholes of the option pricing formula.
After Bachelier, option pricing theory laid dormant in the economics literature for over half a century until renewed study at MIT by Sprenkle (1961) , Samuelson (1965) and Merton and Samuelson (1969) . These papers determined an option's price using the maximizing conditions obtained from an investor's optimal portfolio position. As such, the valuation formulas obtained depended on the expected return on the stock or equivalently, the stock's risk premium. This dependency made these formulas difficult to estimate and to use.
The first difficulty is that risk premia shift according to changing tastes and changing economic fundamentals in an economy, which makes modeling the risk premia and its estimation problematic. At present, there is no generally accepted empirical model for an asset's risk premium that is consistent with the known regularities present in the data (Connor and Korajczyk, 1995; Ferson, 1995) . The second difficulty, perhaps even more important, was that the valuation formulas offered no sense of how to hedge an option using a portfolio of the underlying stock and riskless borrowing or lending. The idea of how to hedge an option is arguably the single most important insight underlying the Black-Merton-Scholes approach. Indeed, it is this insight which enabled the development of new option markets and the formulation of new financial contracts. The story of how the Black-Merton-Scholes option pricing framework was developed is well-told in Black (1989) and Bernstein (1992) . These references are also consistent with first-hand stories related to me by Fischer Black and Robert Merton. Apparently, Fischer Black started working on this problem by himself in the late 1960s. His idea was to apply the capital asset pricing model of Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965) to value the option in a continuous time setting. Using this idea, he obtained an implicit solution for the option's value characterized as a partial differential equation, subject to boundary conditions. However, he could not find its solution. He then teamed up with Myron Scholes, who was also an expert on the capital asset pricing model and who had been thinking about similar problems, to help find a solution. Together, they solved the partial differential equation, using a combination of economic intuition and the earlier pricing formulas.
At this time, Myron Scholes was at MIT. So was Robert C. Merton, who was also at this time applying his ample mathematical skills to various problems in finance, including portfolio theory and option valuation. After various discussions, Merton showed Black and Scholes how to derive their partial differential equation differently; incidentally, the Black-Scholes option pricing formula was first labeled as such by Merton (1970) .3 Merton's derivation used only an argument based on the continuous-time construction of a perfectly hedged portfolio involving the stock and the call option, and the notion that no arbitrage opportunities exist. The Black-Merton-Scholes option pricing technology had been born.
The Intuition of the Black-Merton-Scholes Pricing Argument
The original hedging argument underlying the Black-Merton-Scholes option pricing technology, although profound in implications, is quite intuitive. The idea contains three parts.
Part one recognizes that a call option on the stock increases in value when the stock price rises. This is because as the stock price rises, the stock price is more likely to lie above the strike price at maturity. Hence, the call option is more valuable today. Formally, one can write the call value as a function of the underlying stock price (and, of course, time). Part two uses an implication of this insight. Part one implies that a short position in the stock can be used to hedge against changes in the value of a call option to its holder. A short position in a stock is equivalent to holding a negative number of shares. In practice, the short seller borrows the stock from a broker and sells it to a third party, promising to repay the stock to the broker at a future time, whatever the price of the stock is at that time. To see how this option hedging works, suppose that the stock price rises over a short period, increasing the option's value. The short position in the stock, however, decreases in value since repaying the stock to the broker in the future will cost more. These changes in value partially offset each other, hence, a partial hedge. Conversely, if the stock price falls over a short time period, the value of a call option for that stock decreases in value, but the short position in the stock increases in value. Again, this yields a partial hedge.
Part three modifies the partially hedged position in the long call option and short stock to make it an exact hedge over a short time period. Indeed, under certain hypotheses, it is possible to determine the exact number of shares of stock (less than one) to short for each long call option, so that for any change in the stock price, the change in the value of the call option is exactly offset by the change in value of the short position in the stock. This gives a perfectly hedged portfolio. This perfectly hedged portfolio would then uniquely identify the option's arbitrage free price. Why? The portfolio requires a known initial investment and it is riskless over a given time period. Hence, to avoid arbitrage (profits at no risk of a loss), because the hedged portfolio is riskless, it must earn the riskless rate, which is observable. Otherwise, profits could be made by buying the hedged portfolio and selling the riskless asset, or vice versa. This restriction determines the change in the value of the call option as a function of the value of the underlying stock price and the riskless rate. More precisely, it determines a partial differential equation satisfied by the call's value, whose solution is the Black-Merton-Scholes formula. (The partial differential equation and its solution are given in the appendix.)
The idea of constructing a perfectly hedged portfolio is the key insight of the Black-Merton-Scholes approach, more important than the valuation formula itself. Indeed, if one considers the meaning of a perfectly hedged portfolio, it becomes apparent that it implies that a position in the stock and the riskless asset can be created that exactly duplicates the changes in value to the call option. This position is called a "synthetic option" because it generates the call option's payoffs without explicitly taking a position in the option itself. We will return to the usefulness of synthetic call options later in this essay.
The solution to the partial differential equation obtained from the perfectly hedged portfolio, the Black-Merton-Scholes formula, depends on the option's strike price, its maturity date, the current date, the current stock price, the risk-free interest rate, and the stock price's volatility (as measured by its standard deviation) per unit time. All of these quantities are either directly observable or easily estimated. Perhaps more important is what the call option's value does not depend on. The Black-Merton-Scholes formula does not explicitly depend on the expected return on the stock or, equivalently, the stock's risk premium. Recall that it was this dependency that made the option price formulations of the early and mid-1960s unuseable in practice. It does not depend on the stock's expected return because the perfectly hedged portfolio argument is valid regardless of the change in the stock price or the probability of its changing.
Embedded within the derivation of the Black-Merton-Scholes formula are two key assumptions. The first is that the risk-free interest rate is constant. The second is that the stock price's distribution has a constant volatility. Both assumptions are simplifications of reality, more reasonable for short-term (a year or less) options on assets whose returns are uncorrelated with changes in interest rates, than for long-term options or options on assets whose returns are correlated with interest rates. Typically, these conditions hold true for short-term options on equities or equity indices. These conditions do not apply very well to interest rate derivatives or foreign currency swaps.
The generalization of these two assumptions represents an important component in the evolution of option pricing theory. The first step in the process of generalizing these assumptions began with Robert Merton's (1973a) original publication. In this paper he extended the Black-Merton-Scholes model to the case where the volatility depends on the stock price (footnote 57) and where there is one risky zero-coupon bond trading whose maturity matches the maturity of the option. The original BlackScholes formula only applied to European call and put options. Merton's (1973a) paper also showed how to apply this technology to arbitrary derivatives on the stock, including an American call and put option. Later, Merton (1976a) also generalized the model to include jumps in stock prices. These insights paved the way for the application of this technology to other fields within economics.
The Contribution of the Black-Merton-Scholes Argument to Industry Practice
The Black-Merton-Scholes pricing argument has been central to the development of derivative markets. Options provide a vehicle useful for both speculation and insurance. As an example of the insurance motive, consider an investor who owns a stock that has greatly appreciated in value. Suppose that this investor wants to continue holding the stock, but is nervous about the stock losing value. To insure against this risk, the investor can purchase a put option on the stock with a strike price equal to the stock's current value. In this case, the put option insures the stock's value at the current level. As an example of the speculative motive, consider an investor who is very bullish on a stock, and who wishes to borrow to buy the stock and take advantage of leverage. The investor can implement this speculative strategy by purchasing a call option on the stock-that is, by purchasing the right to buy a certain amount of the stock at a predetermined price at a set time in the future. The initial investment is only the option premium, which is usually a small percentage of the stock's current value.
In thinking about the buying and selling of options, it is important to remember that options trade in a "zero-supply" market, which simply means that for each option sold there must be an option purchased. Options trade in two types of zero-supply markets: organized exchanges, like the Chicago Board Options Exchange, and over the counter (OTC). Exchange-traded options have a physical location or single computer network where all trades take place. In addition, exchange-traded option contracts are standardized in terms of the underlying asset's cash flows, maturity date and strike prices. In contrast, an OTC market consists of multiple brokers and investment bankers, communicating and executing trades via phones and computer screens. OTC contracts are often less standardized and they are tailored to meet the needs of particular traders.
For an exchange-traded option market to grow and succeed, it needs a large investor demand for the derivative financial instrument based on both types of investment motives-insurance and speculation. This is because an exchange needs both buyers and sellers if trade is to occur. In addition, for an exchange-traded option market to succeed, it must be cosdy for individuals to construct the options synthetically, either in terms of transaction costs or know-how. Otherwise, investors would simply invest in the hedge portfolio outlined by the Black-Merton-Scholes hedging argument, which would make an organized option market redundant and unnecessary. These conditions seem to be satisfied by markets in many underlying securities-including equities, foreign currencies, commodities, government bonds-and in many different countries.
For over the counter markets to flourish, the same argument is sufficient, but not necessary. If the demand for a particular type of option is one-sided-say, because a large group of investors wish to act based on the insurance motive-then a broker in the OTC market can create the other side of the market synthetically. Rather than finding a speculator on the other side of the market, the broker can sell the option and synthetically construct the other side of the market. Again, the presence of transaction costs and know-how are necessary to explain why the services of a middleman or broker are necessary. Moreover, in practice, the portfolio is only approximately hedged, due to market frictions and possible model misspecification. This approximate hedging implies that the middleman or broker is speculating, but in a dramatically reduced and controlled manner. Again, the rapid growth of OTC trading suggests that these conditions are satisfied in many markets in many underlying securities, including swaps on interest rates and foreign currencies, mortgage-backed securities, and credit derivatives. The development of the field of derivatives has proceeded along three related lines of inquiry: a study of the mathematical foundations of arbitrage pricing theory; generalizations of the assumptions; and empirical and computational implementation. We will talk about each of these developments in turn.
Mathematical Foundations
The study of the mathematical foundations of derivatives pricing commonly revolves around the meaning of the phrases "no-arbitrage" and "complete markets." No-arbitrage means that prices in markets are such that trading opportunities for profits with no risk are nonexistent. A complete market is one where synthetic construction of any security or derivative is possible. Both concepts underlie the Black-Merton-Scholes option pricing argument. The Black-Merton-Scholes option pricing argument was correct, but the mathematical details were not explicitly formulated. To use (and verify) the argument, precise mathematical definitions needed to be given to these concepts.
The "no-arbitrage" and "complete market" concepts were first formalized in papers by Harrison and Kreps (1979) and Harrison and Pliska (1981) . These papers showed that, under suitable hypotheses, these concepts could be characterized using the notion of a martingale probability distribution. A martingale is a stochastic process whose expected future value equals its current value. Martingales have had a long history of study in probability theory, so significant mathematical machinery has been made available by this discovery.
Essentially, the concept that no arbitrage possibilities exist is equivalent to the notion that the stock's expected future value is the same as its current price (appropriately discounted), which is to say that the stock is properly priced. Any changes in the stock's price through time are caused by unanticipated and random events. For example, if stock prices follow a "random walk," then stock prices follow a martingale.4 Essentially, the concept of market completeness is equivalent to the notion that there is only one martingale probability distribution. That is, there is only one value for a derivative security that is consistent with the prices of the underlying assets. This is because the derivative can be synthetically constructed and we know the fair price of the underlying assets used in the construction. This probabilistic characterization of the economic concepts of no-arbitrage and market completeness introduced mathematicians to the field of derivatives. This, in turn, led to various advances in the underlying probability concepts themselves. This area of investigation is still quite active. In fact, it has its own 4 This characterization of the stock's price is often described as "risk-neutral valuation" (Cox and Ross, 1976), because under the martingale probability distribution, the current stock price can be written as a discounted expected future value, where the risk-free rate provides the appropriate discounting factor. This is the approach that one would use to compute present values in an economy where all investors are risk neutral with common beliefs represented by the martingale probability distribution. A precursor to this insight can be found in the util-probabilities of Merton This interest by mathematicians in derivatives has had some unexpected consequences. One is that various math and engineering departments-for example, at Carnegie Mellon University, Cornell University, the University of Chicago, the University of Michigan, and New York University-have recently introduced masters programs specializing in derivatives and mathematical finance. A second is that mathematicians and physicists can now find alternate and high-paying demand for their skills on Wall Street.
Generalizations of the Assumptions
Two key assumptions underlying the Black-Merton-Scholes model, as mentioned earlier, are constant risk-free interest rates and a constant volatility for the underlying asset. The generalizations of these assumptions are by now quite considerable. To some extent, they followed markets conditions and the need for these generalizations by industry practitioners.5
In the 1970s, the application of derivative models to industry practice was focused primarily on equities and foreign currencies. Generalizations of the BlackMerton-Scholes formula included models in which volatility was random, rather than constant, and models in which stock prices jumped, rather than moving smoothly;Jarrow and Rudd (1983) offer a review of the state of the art in the 1970s. These models typically involve only one or two underlying assets and nonrandom interest rates.
In the 1980s, increased interest rate volatility occurred due to double-digit inflation and the shift from fixed to floating currency exchange rates with the collapse of the Bretton Woods agreement. The increased volatility of interest rates created a new demand for interest rate derivatives, for both motives of insurance and speculation. The assumption of constant interest rates needed to be relaxed. This extension was provided by Ho and Lee (1986), Black, Derman and Toy (1990), and in its greatest generality by Heath, Jarrow and Morton (1992). These models, which represented the first significant development in option pricing theory in over a decade, built upon the mathematical foundations of the Black-Merton-Scholes option pricing theory. These were significant because it quickly became apparent 5There are other implicit assumptions underlying the Black-Merton-Scholes model that I have not mentioned including competitive and frictionless markets. The relaxation of these assumptions have also been studied, but I do not emphasize them here: the assumption of competitive markets (Jarrow, 1994; Cherian and Jarrow, 1995); assumptions of no taxes (Scholes, 1976) ; and assumptions of no transaction costs (Karatzas, 1997) . that all future derivatives pricing applications could be handled as straightforward extensions of this technology. This includes foreign currency pricing problems, credit risk pricing problems, and commodity futures pricing problems.
The common characteristic of these "arbitrage-free term structure models," as they are called, is that there is an evolution of multiple term structures of futures prices or interest rates upon which the derivatives are written. If the no-arbitrage condition holds, analogous to the Black-Merton-Scholes formula, then option prices only depend on the term structure's initial values and volatilities. These later derivative applications were those implemented in the 1990s; Jarrow and Turnbull (1996) provide a review of these models.
At An implicit volatility is that value of the stock's volatility that equates the market price of a call to the Black-Merton-Scholes value (given all the other elements like strike price, maturity date, stock price, and so on). The volatility is implicit because it is inferred from market prices rather than estimated as a sample standard deviation using historic stock price observations. Implicit volatilities have been studied in great detail with respect to their forecasting ability and behavior (Campbell, Lo and MacKinlay, 1997). The evidence, although mixed, leans towards implicit volatilities being better forecasters of future volatilities than historic volatilities.
Implicit volatilities are a convenient summary measure of an option's value. This is because the option's value is strictly increasing in the stock's volatility, everything else constant. In this regard, they are comparable across options with different strikes, different maturities, even different underlying assets. So intuitive is the notion of an implicit volatility that in many markets, including equities and foreign currencies, traders actually quote option prices using implicit volatilities. Only after a trade is completed are implicit volatilities transformed back into dollar prices for final settlement and delivery. This is yet another way in which the Black-Merton-Scholes option pricing technology has had a tremendous impact on industry behavior and practice.
The application of this technology to derivatives pricing and hedging has also been the impetus for advances in the area of computation. To use the BlackMerton-Scholes pricing technology, one needs to be able to compute option prices for numerous different instruments quickly and repeatedly. In many cases, the computational problems can be substantial, since the expected distribution of future cash flows from the derivative can be very complex. In the case of Asian options, for example, the payoffs depend on an average value of the underlying asset over the option's life, which means that an option's current payoffs depend on all past values of the underlying asset, along with other factors. Due to the complexity of the computations, which often involve Monte Carlo simulations and other methods, much research effort has been devoted to studying the methods for computing these values. This research focus is one of the origins of the term "financial engineering." For current issues in this branch of the literature, see the Journal of Computational Finance.
The Field of Corporate Finance
The Black-Merton-Scholes option pricing perspective has had a profound impact on corporate finance, which is the study of the firm's financial and investment decisions. It has had an especially powerful impact on several related areas of corporate finance: contingent claims analysis, capital structure policy and capital budgeting.
Contingent claims analysis is the application of option pricing theory to the valuation of corporate liabilities like debt, equity and convertible bonds. Black and Scholes (1973) and Merton (1970 Merton ( , 1973a Merton ( , 1974 planted the seeds for this area of study in their original papers. To understand this application, consider a firm that has only a single issue of debt outstanding. Suppose that the debt issue has no coupon payments and that it has a fixed principal payable at the maturity of the loan (say, 10 years). When the debt is scheduled to mature, debtholders can either accept the payment of the debt, or if the firm cannot pay the debt, then the debtholders can seize the assets of the equityholders. Black, Merton and Scholes noted that in effect, the firm's equity can thus be considered as a European call option on the firm's assets, with a strike price equal to the face value of the debt and a maturity date equal to the maturity of the debt.
This notion is simple, but powerful. It implies, for example, that the debtholders are actually the ultimate owners of the firm's assets, having written a call option on them to the equityholders. Of course, this contrasts with the traditional finance perspective that the sole owners of the firm are thought to be the equityholders. Contingent claims analysis argues that both the debt-and equityholders "own" the firm; the debtholders get the first stream of payments from the firm's assets and the equityholders get the residual. This notion allows one to understand the conflict between debt-and equityholders and why various corporate liabilities are structured to reduce this conflict.
To illustrate this conflict, consider the simple firm discussed earlier, with only a single issue of debt with no coupons. Let interest rates be constant, and let the firm's asset returns exhibit constant volatility. Since the equity is a European call option on the value of the assets, we know from the Black-MertonScholes formula that the value of equity is increasing in the volatility of the firm's asset returns. Essentially, this occurs because greater volatility raises the chance of an extremely good outcome for equityholders, but since the losses of equityholders are bounded at zero, they do not need to worry about whether losses below a certain level are slight or considerable. Consequently, once debt is in place, equityholders have an incentive (acting through management) to increase the risk of the firm's assets, thereby increasing the value of their equity and decreasing the value of the debt. This effect is known as the agency cost of debt (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).
Clearly, maximizing firm value may be distinct from maximizing the equity value. Equityholders and management will tend to choose the latter at the expense of the debtholders. However, rational debtholders will anticipate this difference and price the original debt issue accordingly. This generates the possibility for an optimal debt/equity ratio, providing an alternative to the Modigliani and Miller (1958) irrelevance theorem showing that under certain assumptions, the debt/ equity ratio simply involves different ways of slicing up the corporate pie, but is irrelevant to the question of maximizing firm value. This equityholder/debtholder conflict can also be used to understand why, for example, firms issue convertible debt to avoid these agency costs (Brealey and Myers, 1991) .
This notion of contingent claims also allows one to quantify the probability that a firm's debt will default, generating a credit rating methodology comparable to that credit rating used by Moody's or Standard & Poor's. This topic is of considerable current interest both in the academic and professional communities (Jarrow, 1998 Capital budgeting is the study of the optimal selection of a firm's investment projects. Finance textbooks teach correctly that investment projects should be selected to maximize the net present value of the firm. What option pricing theory adds is the recognition that most investment projects have options embedded within them. Purchasing land, for example, has the embedded option of developing it immediately or at some future date. Further, whatever type of real estate usage is selected at the time of development-farming, residential building, commercial building-typically involves other embedded options. The Black-MertonScholes option pricing argument provides a method for valuing these options, which are commonly called "real" options.
Real option pricing theory has been applied to oil leases, forest development, the mining of precious metals, land development, the production process of a firm and the use of excess capacity (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994; Amram and Kulatilaka, 1999). The issues of real option pricing often become entangled in the conflict between debt-and equityholders, since equityholders may wish to use these options to increase the volatility of the firm's returns. Again, the agency costs of debt generate the possibility for an optimal debt/equity ratio and provide a better understanding of the pecking order of corporate debt (Myers and Majluf, 1984) .
Broader Insights Across Economics
Within economics, the area most influenced by the Black-Merton-Scholes option pricing theory has been money and banking, or more broadly, financial markets and institutions. In turn, insights from these areas influence both monetary policy in macroeconomics and exchange rate determination in international economics.
Within the field of money and banking, option pricing theory has been used to model Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) premiums as the value of a put option, issued by the government to the individual banks (Merton, 1977) . This put option protects the depositors' account balances from default by the bank. This insight allows one to understand the incentives of bank management under a FDIC system. In the area of asset and liability management, the Black-MertonScholes option pricing technology has been applied to the valuation of mortgagebacked securities, credit card portfolios, certificates of deposits, NOW (Negotiable Orders of Withdrawals) accounts-in fact, to the entire balance sheet of the bank (arrow and van Deventer, 1998).
Most recently, the application of option pricing to corporate loans, the mainstay of commercial banking, has received much attention. Corporate loans often default, and this possibility necessitates higher required interest payments. The difference between corporate interest rates and Treasury (or default-free) rates is known as a credit risk spread. Implicit in this credit risk spread is the probability of default and the recovery rate in the event of default. Because corporate debt has different maturities, there is a term structure of credit risk spreads. A recent approach to pricing corporate debt is to model the bankruptcy process implicitly by modeling the arbitrage-free evolution of the term structure of credit risk spreads to Treasuries (Jarrow and Turnbull, 1995) . This approach recovers the implied default probabilities, recovery rates and can even be used to generate credit ratings. Option pricing formulas have become an essential tool for banks and bank regulators in thinking about capital standards and financial positions.7
In other areas of economics, financial instruments like life insurance and pension fund guarantee contracts can be priced and hedged using the BlackMerton-Scholes technology. With the aging population, this area of investigation is growing (Bodie and Merton, 1992). Option valuation theory in the form of real options can also be used in industrial organizations to understand a firm's exit and entry decision and in labor economics to understand a firm's temporary versus permanent hiring decisions (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994) . It has been used in the area of international economics to understand exchange rate behavior (Baldwin and Krugman, 1989; Dixit, 1989) . In general equilibrium theory, the mathematical foundations of arbitrage pricing theory have been used to generate existence proofs for competitive equilibrium in both complete and incomplete markets (Duffie, 1996) , to characterize Arrow-Debreu securities in markets with a continuum of states (Breeden and Litzenberger, 1978) , and to provide sufficient conditions for complete markets . Merton (1998) offers additional applications of option pricing theory to economics.
Conclusion
The insights of Robert C. Merton, Myron Scholes, and Fischer Black on option pricing have had a substantial impact in many areas. In the social 7 Credit risk measurement is an important consideration in the determination of Value-at-Risk (VAR) computations, required by banks, for their capital determination. VAR is a measure of the value that a bank's portfolio is no smaller than with some pre-stated probability, like 5 percent, over a given time period, usually 7 or 10 days. Although VAR computations are required by regulators, there is significant academic debate on the usefulness of VAR as a risk measure (Artzner, Delbean, Eber and Heath, 1999). sciences, their insights initiated derivatives, a new field of research. Within economics, these insights have illuminated areas of corporate finance, financial markets and institutions, industrial organizations, labor economics, international economics, and general equilibrium. In the financial industry, these insights enabled the growth and expansion of derivative markets in equities, foreign currencies, interest rates, and commodities. They also enabled the creation of new firms and organizational structures within firms with respect to trading opportunities and risk management. In society at large, these innovations improved the efficiency of financial markets and facilitated a more optimal allocation of resources. The Black-Merton-Scholes option pricing theory is believed by many scholars, myself included, to be one of the most successful applications of economic theory in the history of economics.
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